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  Abstract 
 
Numeric anchoring occurs when exposure to a numeric quantity biases a person’s 
subsequent judgment involving other quantities. This could be applicable to the evaluation of 
pain, where exposure to an unrelated number prior to evaluation of pain could influence pain 
ratings. This study aimed to determine whether exposure to a random numeric anchor influences 
subsequent pain intensity ratings of a hypothetical patient. In this study, 385 participants read a 
vignette describing a patient with chronic pain before being randomly assigned to one of four 
groups. Groups 1 and 2 spun an 11-wedge number wheel (0-10) that was, unbeknownst to the 
participants, programmed to stop on a high number (‘8’) or a low number (‘2’), respectively. 
Group 3 spun a similar letter wheel (A-K) that stopped on ‘C’ or ‘I’ (Control 1). Group 4 did not 
spin a wheel (Control 2). Participants were then asked to rate the patient’s pain intensity using a 
0-10 numeric rating scale. The high-number group rated the patient’s pain (Median ± IQR = 8 ± 
2) significantly higher than the letter wheel control (Median ± IQR = 7 ± 2, p < .05) and the low-
number group (Median ± IQR = 6 ± 2, p < .001). The low-number group rated the pain 
significantly lower than Control 1 and 2 (Median ± IQR = 7 ± 2) (both p < .05). Pain ratings 
were influenced by prior exposure to a random number with no relevant information about the 
patient’s pain, indicating anchoring had occurred. However, contrary to the traditional definition 
of anchoring where anchoring occurs even when participants are unaware of the anchor's 
influence, in this study the anchoring effect was seen only in participants who believed that they 
had been influenced by the anchor. Future studies should evaluate the role of influence in 
anchoring effects, specifically determining the conditions under which awareness of the anchor 
occurs. Further studies should also evaluate the role of anchoring effects in health care provider’s 
judgments of patient’s pain.  
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Background and Introduction 
 
Chronic pain is prevalent in 18.9% of Canadian adults, and almost half of those who have 
chronic pain have suffered for over ten years (Schopflocher, Taenzer, & Jovey, 2011). With both 
the prevalence and longevity of chronic pain, the burden of chronic pain on the Canadian 
healthcare system is not surprising. In health care alone, chronic pain is shown to have an 
incremental cost that is 51% higher than a propensity-matched cohort, totaling to approximately 
$7.2 billion in 2014 (Hogan, Taddio, Katz, Shah, & Krahn, 2016). Chronic pain has also been 
shown to cost Canadian health care an additional $37 billion lost due to sick days and 
unemployment each year (Schopflocher et al., 2011). In addition to the societal costs of chronic 
pain, those who suffer from chronic pain are also at a higher risk of sleep disturbances (Morin, 
Gibson, & Wade, 1998), depression (Bair, Robinson, Katon, & Kroenke, 2003; Fishbain, Cutler, 
Rosomoff, & Rosomoff, 1997), anxiety (Lerman, Rudich, Brill, Shalev, & Shahar, 2015), 
decreased quality of life (Hunfeld et al., 2001), and overall decreased physical functioning 
(Ullrich, Askay, & Patterson, 2009). In fact, among those with chronic diseases, individuals with 
chronic pain have been found to have the lowest health-related quality of life with all of its 
associated consequences when compared with similar cohorts with heart disease, diabetes, and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Hogan, Taddio, Katz, Shah, & Krahn, 2017).  
Given the significant impact that chronic pain has on both a personal and societal level, it 
is therefore important to also understand how inferences are made as to another person’s pain 
experience as it can affect their course of treatment, including how and when their treatment is 
received. This is particularly important when also considering that early intervention has been 
shown to reduce chronic pain disability and medication use (Gatchel et al., 2003), making it all 
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the more vital that pain is assessed as accurately and quickly as possible by the patient’s 
healthcare team. Healthcare providers are often required to assess and treat pain; however, it is 
recognized that healthcare provider ratings of a patient’s pain intensity may be biased and 
inaccurate (Tait, Chibnall, & Kalauokalani, 2009). Patient, healthcare provider, and 
environmental or situational factors contribute to the providers’ perception and interpretation of a 
patient’s pain intensity. Examples of factors that have been shown to be associated with biased 
provider ratings include past work experience (Choinière, Melzack, Girard, Rondeau, & Paquin, 
1990), physician gender (Weisse, Sorum, & Dominguez, 2003), and availability of medical 
evidence (Chibnall, Tait, & Ross, 1997). In these circumstances, provider ratings often do not 
align with patient ratings and instead tend to over- or under-estimate patient self-report (Chibnall 
et al., 1997; Choinière et al., 1990; Marquie et al., 2003). It is therefore important to consider the 
processes by which situational factors contribute to biased provider ratings. (Riva, Rusconi, 
Montali, & Cherubini, 2011). 
The aim of this research project is to explore whether the exposure to a random number 
could influence how a patient’s pain intensity is inferred, using the concept of numerical 
anchoring. Numerical anchoring represents a cognitive bias where prior exposure to a numeric 
value influences subsequent numerical decisions. It has been studied extensively in a number of 
settings (Blankenship, Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Macy, 2008; Furnham & Boo, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2013; Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Jarvis, 2001), but has rarely been studied 
in the context of pain. Given that pain is most often rated on a numeric pain scale (Hawker, 
Mian, Kendzerska, & French, 2011), it is important to determine how anchoring may play a role 
in how a person’s subjective pain experience is inferred. 
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Chronic Pain Definition 
 
Pain is defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) as “an 
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience with actual or potential tissue damage, or described 
in terms of such damage” (IASP, 2017). Chronic pain in particular was previously defined as 
“pain that persists past normal healing time, and hence lacks acute warning function of 
physiological nociception” (Treede et al., 2019). In other words, the pain no longer holds the 
function of warning the body that tissue damage is impending, or occurring. This definition was 
later expanded upon to give the distinction that chronic pain is pain that persists longer than three 
months (Schopflocher et al., 2011; Treede et al., 2019). However, IASP has recently updated the 
definition of chronic pain to differentiate between chronic pain that is not a symptom of any 
other chronic pain condition (chronic primary pain) versus chronic pain that is a symptom of a 
different underlying condition (chronic secondary pain) such as chronic cancer-related pain or 
chronic post-surgical pain (Treede et al., 2019). In chronic secondary pain, the pain is typically 
predated by some injury or insult to the underlying tissue. Despite treatment, the pain persists 
beyond the normal recovery time, or continues even once the original diagnosis is no longer 
relevant (Treede et al., 2019). Conversely, chronic primary pain can be seen as a health condition 
on its own, and does not require any other chronic condition to meet diagnostic criteria. This new 
definition better captures certain conditions such as fibromyalgia, complex regional pain 
syndrome, chronic primary headache, and or nonspecific low-back pain, where there is often no 
clear cause or injury preceding the chronic pain (Treede et al., 2019). 
Pain Assessment 
 
Given the uniquely subjective experience of pain, it is important that the methods used 
for pain assessment are both reliable and valid. Pain assessment is not only valuable for guiding 
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the patient’s treatment, but also for diagnostic purposes as well as tracking a patient’s pain over 
time (Fillingim, Loeser, Baron, & Edwards, 2016). However, given that pain is such a personal 
experience, the gold standard method for pain assessment is through self-report. Self-reported 
pain assessment covers several domains to ensure that the healthcare provider is given a 
comprehensive overview of the patient’s pain. These domains include where the pain is located, 
how long the pain has been present, how the pain feels to the patient, and what factors improve 
or worsen the pain. However, the most renowned domain of pain assessment is that of pain 
intensity, which measures the “strength” of the pain (Fillingim et al., 2016). Pain intensity is 
most commonly measured using a numeric rating scale, whereby the patient rates their pain 
intensity on a 0 (no pain) to 10 (worst pain imaginable) scale (Nicholas et al., 2019). Often, the 
patient may also be asked to assess their pain retrospectively by using a numeric rating scale to 
rate their average pain intensity over the past week (Treede et al., 2019). The numeric rating 
scale is used with the majority of patients, and has been found to be easy for patients to use and 
understand as well as statistically useful for healthcare providers to track the patient’s pain 
(Fillingim et al., 2016). 
Despite the fact that numeric rating scales have been shown to be reliable and valid for 
pain assessment in most populations, there are still a number of factors that can influence how a 
person’s pain is inferred. A number of studies have shown that healthcare providers pain ratings 
often do not align with the patient’s, and instead tend to over- or under-estimate patient self-
report (Chibnall et al., 1997; Choinière et al., 1990; Marquie et al., 2003).  
For example, length of time in practice is one factor that has been shown to influence 
health care professionals’ ratings of a patient’s pain. Choiniere et al (1990) showed that nurses 
who had been frequently exposed to burn patients in extreme pain tended to under-estimate the 
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patient’s pain, while newer nurses tended to over-estimate their pain. It is possible that nurses 
who are more frequently exposed to burn patients become desensitized to these extreme pain 
complaints, or find the treatments to be routine, thus allowing them to perceive their patient’s 
pain experience as being less intense, while those who are less experienced become 
overwhelmed and more emotionally affected by the patient’s pain (Choinière et al., 1990). 
Gender may also contribute to how a patient’s pain is perceived by both healthcare 
workers as well as non-medical professionals. Firstly, the gender of the patient has been shown 
to influence how their pain is rated by health care professionals, with male patients’ pain being 
rated as significantly lower than females  (Robinson & Wise, 2003; Weisse et al., 2003). As well, 
the gender of the rater can influence how they rate the patient’s pain, as it has been found that 
female raters tend to judge the patient’s pain as higher than male raters, regardless of the 
patient’s gender (Robinson & Wise, 2003).  
Availability of medical evidence has also been shown to influence how a patient’s pain 
intensity is inferred by healthcare professionals. In a study conducted by Chibnall et al. (1997), 
medical students were asked to read vignettes of a hypothetical patient where the patient reported 
their pain intensity as being low (corresponding to a 3/10 pain intensity rating on a 0-10 numeric 
rating scale), moderate (5/10 pain intensity rating), high (7/10 pain intensity rating), or very high 
(9/10 pain intensity rating). In each pain intensity category, one of two vignettes was shown to 
participants. In half of the vignettes, medical evidence for the patient’s pain, such as objective 
medical test results, was present. For the other half, medical evidence was not provided. The 
results of this study demonstrated that both availability of medical evidence as well as the pain 
intensity levels, had an influence on how the hypothetical patient’s pain was perceived. In 
particular, higher pain ratings tended to be discounted by the medical students, while lower pain 
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ratings were seen as more accurate depictions of the patient’s pain. As well, when the medical 
students had medical evidence available, their pain and disability ratings of the hypothetical 
patients were higher than those in the no medical evidence condition.  
It is important to consider the processes by which situational factors contribute to biased 
provider ratings (Riva et al., 2011). The factors listed above are only some of the situational 
factors that can influence how a patient’s pain is perceived; however, there is still a need to 
continue exploring different sources of bias to determine how inferences are made about a 
patient’s pain experience. In many of these factors listed above, perceptions of the patient’s 
experiences are distorted through cognitive biases. 
Cognitive biases 
 
A cognitive bias influences how stimuli in the environment are attended to, remembered, 
and processed (Pincus & Morley, 2001). Morewedge and Kahneman (2010) further expand on 
this definition by explaining that cognitive biases are a function of a dual-system model of 
reasoning. In this model, “System 1” uses an intuitive or heuristic, cognitive system to make 
judgments in an automatic and fast manner. “System 2” on the other hand, allows us to make 
more calculated decisions by being a slower and more conscious system. A cognitive bias under 
the dual-system model is therefore seen as the joint failure of both systems. Namely, System 1 
creates an initial biased impression, and then System 2 fails to correct the biased impression. 
Devine (1989) studied dual-processing in the form of stereotypes. Caucasian participants were 
recruited and asked to write down common labels of African Americans, and their personal 
thoughts towards the racial group before being asked to complete the Modern Racism Scale 
which measures a person’s prejudice level towards a certain group. The researchers found that 
despite high- and low- prejudiced participants having equal knowledge of the common 
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stereotypes associated with African-Americans, those who were low in prejudice tended to 
inhibit stereotype-congruent thoughts, and instead replaced them with thoughts of equality or 
reasons why the stereotypes are false. In the low-prejudice group, we see dual-activation of 
Systems 1 and 2. Though the stereotyped thoughts were equally present (System 1), those in the 
low-prejudice group were able to effectively use System 2 to inhibit the stereotypical thoughts. 
Using the dual-system approach, heuristics, an aspect of System 1, will be evaluated 
further in this study. Heuristics themselves are not cognitive biases and more often than not, they 
are helpful in allowing mental shortcuts in an effective and efficient manner; however, they may 
occasionally lead to bias when the heuristic is relied upon too heavily.  According to Tversky 
and Kahneman (1973),  heuristics can be further categorized into representativeness, availability, 
and anchoring.  
 Heuristics definition. Although heuristics themselves are not cognitive biases, they may 
occasionally lead to cognitive biases.  An individual’s capacity for information processing is 
limited, and often time-sensitive. As a result, the human brain often makes shortcuts, or “rules of 
thumb” to be able to process information more efficiently (Haselton, Nettle, & Murray, 2015). 
These shortcuts are automatic, and often individuals are not aware of the biases that governed 
their thought processes or decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Representativeness definition. Representativeness refers to the probability that an object 
or person can be accurately categorized in a certain way (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In a 
study conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), participants were given brief personality 
descriptions of a number of individuals before being asked to rate the probability that each 
individual worked as an engineer or as a lawyer. The researchers found that regardless of the 
  8 
  
 
actual probability of each occupation, participants tended to categorize the hypothetical workers 
based on their preconceived notions of what the personality of a lawyer or engineer would be.  
Availability definition. Availability uses prior experience to process information and 
make judgments regarding frequency or probability. The more often a particular event has been 
experienced, the more easily it will be brought to mind, and vice versa (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). For example, for a healthcare professional working in a hospital, the sound of sirens 
might have them automatically assume the sound comes from an ambulance, rather than from a 
police vehicle or fire truck. The classic study of availability was conducted by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973), where participants were asked whether there were more words in the English 
language that began with the letter K, or had K as its third letter. Participants were asked the 
same question with a number of different letters. In all letters, the participants judged the first 
position to be more common than the letter being placed in the third position. This is likely due 
to the availability heuristic- it is much easier to think of words that begin with the letter K than it 
is to think of words that have K as its third letter, despite the fact that in each case given to 
participants, it was more common to have the letter in the third position.  
Anchoring definition. Anchoring, as mentioned previously, is a cognitive bias where the 
prior exposure to a numeric value influences subsequent decisions. In other words, when 
individuals are given an initial value, further estimates are made using that initial value as a 
starting point for their judgments. It has been suggested that anchoring effects occur when the 
first information that comes to mind ultimately influences the individual to use that information 
in their decision making processes (Epley, 2004).  
Anchoring 
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Anchoring was initially defined and studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). In their 
classic anchoring study, the researchers asked participants to estimate the number of African 
countries in the United Nations (UN) before they spun a rigged wheel with numbers between 0-
100. The wheel was designed to stop at the number 10 or 65.  After spinning the wheel, 
participants were asked to indicate whether the number they spun was too high or too low of an 
estimate, before being asked to estimate the actual number of African countries in the UN. 
Participants who spun the number 10 estimated that there were 25 African countries in the 
United Nations whereas those who spun 65 estimated that there were 45. Thus, exposure to a 
prior number anchored participants to a lower or higher value and influenced their response to a 
later unrelated question.  
Selective accessibility model. Mussweiler and Strack (1999) explain the anchoring effect 
through the Selective Accessibility Model, also known as assimilation anchoring. The selective 
accessibility model breaks anchoring down into two subsequent steps. First, participants engage 
in a comparative task, where they are asked to compare the anchor to a target (in the example 
above, Strack and Mussweiler (1997)state that the target would be the number of African 
countries in the UN, and the comparative task is asking participants whether the number they 
spun is higher, lower, or equal to the number of African countries in the UN). Participants are 
then asked to engage in an absolute task, where they are asked to give an estimate or judgment 
(in the example above, Mussweiler and Strack (1999) state that the absolute task would be asking 
the participants to estimate how many African countries are in the UN) (Mussweiler & Strack, 
1999).  
In the selective accessibility model, anchoring effects are explained by a selectivity 
hypothesis and an accessibility hypothesis. That is, participants selectively use semantic 
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knowledge to help them conclude that the target value is equal to the anchor. For example, 
Northcraft and Neale (1987) recruited both real estate agents (expert subjects), as well as 
undergraduate students (amateur subjects) to determine if anchoring effects could influence the 
perceived value of a property for sale. Participants were given a packet containing a summary of 
a property for sale, which had an appraisal value of $74,900. Each group (amateur and expert) 
was randomized into one of two conditions, each of which gave a false appraisal value of ±12% 
($65, 900 and $83,900, respectively, for both the amateur and expert subjects) from the true 
appraisal value ($74,900), and asked to generate a suggested listing price for the property. The 
researchers found a significant anchoring effect in both expert and amateur subjects, where those 
who had been given a higher appraisal were more likely to generate a higher listing price, and 
vice versa. In this case, the appraisal value acted as an anchor for the participants, to compare to 
their target value of their generated listing price. In this case, it is clear that the appraisal values 
given (anchors) and the listing price (target) are semantically related, especially considering that 
the appraisal value is typically used to generate a listing price in most real estate situations. The 
selective accessibility model suggests that as the participants form these semantic connections, 
the accessibility of the anchor increases, thus allowing the participant to use the numerical 
anchor to create their final judgments (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999).   
A number of studies have demonstrated the anchoring effect using similar two-step 
procedures outlined by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), where participants are asked to first 
compare the anchor to the target, before being asked to provide an estimation. Anchoring effects 
have been found using both numeric anchors that are related to the target, such as real estate 
estimates (Northcraft, Neale, & processes, 1987), and legal judgments (Enough & Mussweiler, 
2001), as well as numeric anchors that are unrelated to the target. Similar to the study above 
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where the numeric anchor may be completely unrelated to the target, anchoring effects have also 
been found in studies using irrelevant anchors that influence participants’ judgment regarding 
general knowledge or factual questions (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), or estimates of self-
efficacy (Peake & Cervone, 1989).   
What makes the results of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) especially interesting is that 
given the situational context of a ‘random’ spinning wheel, the numeric anchor was totally 
unrelated to the estimation task. The anchor could not possibly provide any useful information 
about the estimation task and yet it clearly influenced the participants’ responses. With this in 
mind, anchoring effects in the context of random numerical anchoring especially hold the 
implicit assumption that any anchoring effects are operating through cognitive processes that are 
outside of awareness.  
However, despite the selective accessibility model holding merit in the cases where the 
numeric anchor is semantically related to the target, in the case of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974)’s study on random numerical anchoring, and in any case of random numerical anchoring, 
it seems unlikely that anchoring effects can be completely attributed to the selective accessibility 
model, given that the anchor provides the participants with no semantic knowledge on which 
they can base their decisions.  In the case of random numerical anchoring, Strack and 
Mussweiler (1997) instead have proposed that anchoring effects may instead be due to numeric 
priming. Specifically, random numerical anchoring occurs simply because the number that the 
participant has been exposed to is more accessible to the participant, which subsequently 
influences their decisions (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Therefore, it is generally accepted that 
while numeric anchoring typically relies on the semantic relationship between the target and the 
anchor, random numerical anchoring relies instead on the anchor’s accessibility to the 
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participant, and typically occurs outside of the participant’s awareness (Strack & Mussweiler, 
1997). Interestingly, despite the implicit assumption that anchoring effects, arising from a 
“random”, unrelated anchor, are outside the participant’s awareness, only one previous study has 
looked at how participants’ awareness of the anchor influenced their subsequent decisions. Only 
two studies have examined if anchoring effects could be negated by warning the participants of 
the anchoring effect (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Quattrone, 1982). In a series of experiments, 
Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke (1996) found that anchoring effects were pervasive, even if 
participants were warned of the anchor’s influence, or were asked whether they believed they 
had been influenced by the anchor. Notably, anchoring effects were found even in those who 
indicated they had not been influenced by the anchor, though the anchoring effects were found to 
be larger the more informative the anchor was perceived to be. These relevant anchors are in 
contrast to the original anchoring study conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) where the 
spinning wheel produced an anchor that held no relevant or useful information for the subsequent 
decisions. 
 In line with the studies conducted by Wilson et al. (1996) using relevant, informative 
anchors, anchoring effects have also been studied extensively where the numeric anchor is 
directly relevant or related to the target value. Of particular interest, anchoring effects have also 
been studied in the healthcare context. Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz, and Bergus (2007) 
conducted a study where physicians were given a vignette of a hypothetical patient. The 
physicians were then asked to indicate the probability that the patient had a pulmonary 
embolism, which is known in the medical community to be very difficult to diagnose, and 
therefore diagnoses are often made with a fair amount of uncertainty. Participants were then 
randomized to be exposed to a “high” numerical anchor, or “low” numerical anchor, asking if 
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they believed that the chance of a pulmonary embolism was greater than, or less than, 90% or 
1%, respectively, before being asked to give their absolute judgment of the probability. Similar 
to previous anchoring studies, the physicians who were exposed to the low numerical anchor 
tended to rate the probability of the patient having a pulmonary embolism as being lower (23%) 
than those in the high numerical anchoring group (53%).  
 Anchoring effects have also been studied in relation to pain but to a much lesser extent. 
Riva and colleagues (2011) demonstrated that there may be an anchoring bias in healthcare 
professionals’ perceptions of patient pain. The researchers recruited 423 health care professionals 
who read vignettes describing a patient presenting with a headache. Participants randomized to 
the experimental arm were asked to rate the patient’s level of pain immediately after reading the 
vignette and again after learning of the patient’s pain rating, while control group participants 
were asked to rate the patient’s level of pain only after learning of the patient’s self-reported pain 
level. Healthcare professionals in the experimental condition tended to maintain their original 
pain rating, or, did not sufficiently alter it, after hearing the patient’s subjective pain rating. In 
contrast, those in the control condition tended to agree with the patient’s subjective pain rating. 
The results of the experimental condition indicate that once an initial judgment of pain had been 
made by the healthcare professionals, the patient’s self-reported pain rating did not influence the 
professionals’ final decision of the patient’s pain intensity (Riva et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
under the appropriate groups, the presence of a pain-related numeric anchor in the form of a 
patient’s pain rating may unintentionally influence a healthcare provider’s evaluation of a 
patient’s pain. 
Anchoring in the context of pain can also occur if physicians make an initial probability 
estimate of a certain diagnosis (Bravata, 2000). Once an initial probability estimate has been 
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established, the physician has effectively set an anchor, and subsequently uses tests to confirm 
this likelihood. In some cases, this may lead to correct diagnoses; however, this anchor may also 
lead to poor judgment or incorrect diagnoses (Bravata, 2000). Given the importance of early 
intervention for chronic pain patients, it is all the more important to understand whether 
anchoring effects influence how a patient’s pain is perceived. 
The Present Study 
 
Pain-related numeric anchors appear to influence a healthcare provider’s perception of 
patient pain (Riva et al., 2011).  However, it remains to be seen whether a ‘random’ numeric 
anchor, with no relevance to the subsequent estimation task, can influence an individual’s 
perception of someone else’s pain. This has relevance to healthcare providers, as it would 
indicate that numeric quantities unrelated to the patient may influence how a healthcare provider 
evaluates the patient’s pain. It would also demonstrate a novel situational factor that operates 
through a cognitive bias to unwittingly influence the health care provider’s estimate of the 
patient’s pain.  The present study aimed to provide a preliminary assessment of whether 
exposure to a ‘random’ numeric anchor influences subsequent estimates of a hypothetical 
patient’s pain intensity ratings. 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the literature reviewed above, the following hypotheses were made: 
1.  Participants who are exposed to a numerical anchor will be influenced by that anchor, 
with the median pain rating of participants who were exposed to a high numerical anchor 
being significantly higher than the median pain rating of those who are exposed to a low 
numerical anchor.  
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2. Median pain ratings of those who are not exposed to an anchor will be higher than those 
who are exposed to the low anchor, but lower than the median pain rating of those who 
are exposed to the high-anchor.  
3. The median pain ratings of the two groups that are not exposed to a numerical anchor will 
not differ from one another. 
4. Participants who are originally not exposed to a numerical anchor will anchor to their 
original pain ratings when asked to re-rate the patient’s pain, even if they are 
subsequently exposed to a high anchor.  That is, median pain ratings of those who are 
originally not exposed to a numerical anchor will remain unchanged even after the 
subsequent exposure to the high numerical anchor.  
5. The median pain ratings of those who believe that they were influenced by the anchor 
within each group will not be significantly different from those who do not believe they 
were influenced.  
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Methods 
Participants 
A total of 516 participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk (Amazon.com, Inc. 
Seattle, WA), an online study recruitment website that has millions of users world-wide who 
participate in Human Intelligence Tasks in exchange for money (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 
2013). The only inclusion criterion was that participants be fluent in English.  Of the 516 
participants, 385 (223 males, 162 females, Mage
= 35.85, SD= 10.96, range= 19-72) were included 
in the final analysis. Figure 1 shows the flow chart depicting participant recruitment.  
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Figure 1: Flow chart of participant recruitment. 
 
Procedures 
 
This study was reviewed and approved by the York University Research Ethics Board 
(Human Participants Review Committee certificate #e2018-017). Informed consent to participate 
was obtained prior to the start of the study, and participants were compensated $1 USD for their 
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time. The study was administered using Qualtrics software (Version May 2018, Provo, UT, 
USA), an online survey management system. Participants were directed to the Qualtrics website, 
where they provided informed consent to participate and completed demographic questions, 
including questions regarding their history of pain. Participants were then randomized into one of 
four groups using the randomizer available through Qualtrics. Each group was asked to read the 
following vignette which describes the journey of a hypothetical person from injury, post-injury 
chronic pain, to rehabilitation: 
“Steve lives in a modest house on a quiet, tree-lined street very close to a 
major highway. Last year, as Steve was driving to work one morning, he 
was involved in a serious collision that nearly cost him his life. He spent 
months in the hospital and underwent multiple surgeries to repair his leg 
which was shattered in the crash. After many more months of physical 
rehabilitation, Steve is left with chronic leg pain and requires a cane to 
walk especially when the pain acts up. Steve sees his physical therapist once 
a week for treatment and despite the increased pain he has after each 
session, he feels the therapy is helping.” 
Virtual spinning wheels comprised of 11 wedges each were created using Adobe Flash 
animation for the purposes of the present study. Unbeknownst to the participants, these virtual 
spinning wheels were programmed online to stop at a pre-determined value. Participants in 
Groups 1 (n = 102) and 2 (n = 93) spun an online wheel containing the numbers 0 to 10, that was 
programmed to stop on either a high number (8) or a low number (2), respectively. To control for 
viewing numeric values, participants in Group 3 (n=102) spun a similar wheel containing the 
letters A-K that was programmed to stop on either the letter “C” or “I”. To control for the 
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spinning of the wheel itself, participants in Group 4 (n = 87) read the vignette and initially did 
not spin a wheel. Figure 2 illustrates the wheels used for Groups 1, 2, and 3. 
 
Figure 2. Spinning wheels used for Group 1 (A), Group 2 (B), and Group 3 (C and D) 
 
Immediately after spinning the wheel, participants in Groups 1 and 2 were asked to recall 
the number they saw on the wheel, and to indicate if they thought the number was higher, lower, 
or equal to the intensity of pain that the patient in the vignette experiences on a typical day. 
Those in Group 3 were only asked to recall the letter they saw on the wheel spin. Participants in 
Groups 1-3 were then asked to estimate the patient’s pain intensity on a typical day using a 0 
(“no pain”) to 10 (“worst possible pain”) numeric rating scale (NRS). Subsequent questions were 
completed to ascertain whether participants in Groups 1-3 believed that the anchor had 
influenced their pain intensity rating of the patient, and if so, in what way.  
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Participants in Group 4 were asked to provide a NRS pain rating immediately after 
reading the vignette. Upon providing a pain rating, participants in Group 4, who initially did not 
spin a wheel, were asked to re-read the vignette, spin the high-anchor wheel (set to stop on the 
number 8), and re-rate the patient’s pain. This was done to determine whether participants in 
Group 4 would anchor to their own original pain rating, or if they would be influenced by the 
numerical anchor. 
After completing the experimental task, all participants completed the Pain 
Catastrophizing Scale (PCS) and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) as previous 
studies have indicated that both pain catastrophizing and anxiety or depression are associated 
with pain ratings (Gerrits, van Marwijk, van Oppen, van der Horst, & Penninx, 2015; Quartana, 
Campbell, & Edwards, 2009; Snaith, 2003; M. J. Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995). Of particular 
interest, individuals high on pain catastrophizing scales have also been shown to infer more 
intense pain in others (M. Sullivan, Martel, Tripp, Savard, & Crombez, 2006). As such, it is 
important to ensure that anchoring effects are not confounded by pain catastrophization. 
Measures 
 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). The HADS measures symptoms of 
anxiety and depression, and has been widely used among both clinical and non-clinical 
populations (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 2002). It contains 14 items, consisting of two 
subscales. Seven items comprise the anxiety subscale, and seven items comprise the depression 
subscale. Each item is rated on a 0-3 Likert scale. Higher scores are associated with a higher 
severity of anxiety or depressive symptoms (Bjelland et al., 2002). Subscale scores range from 0-
21, where scores equal to or below seven indicate no clinically relevant findings of depression or 
anxiety (“normal”). Scores between eight and ten are suggestive of a possible mood disorder 
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(“borderline abnormal”), and scores between 11-21 are suggestive of the probable presence of a 
mood disorder (“abnormal”) (Snaith, 2003) The HADS has been found to be reliable in detecting 
states of anxiety and depression and their associated severity. It has good internal consistency 
(α= .82), and has been very well-validated in a number of settings (Bjelland et al., 2002).  The 
internal consistency of the HADS for the present study was .91. 
Pain Catastrophizing Scale (PCS). The PCS measures the extent to which an individual 
experiences pain-related catastrophic thinking, including how much they think and worry about 
pain, magnify the amount of pain experienced, and feel helpless towards painful experiences. It 
consists of 13 items, each rated on a five-point Likert scale, with scores ranging from 0-52. 
Scores above 30 are considered to be clinically relevant for catastrophizing. (M. J. Sullivan et al., 
1995) Individuals who score higher on the PCS also tend to report more intense pain experiences 
as well as heightened anxiety and depression symptoms (M. J. Sullivan et al., 1995). These 
individuals also tend to use more analgesic medication, have longer hospitalizations, and tend to 
demonstrate an increase in pain behaviours and pain-related disabilities (M. J. Sullivan et al., 
1995). The PCS has demonstrated good internal consistency (α= .87), and has been well 
validated in both clinical and non-clinical samples (M. J. Sullivan et al., 1995). In the present 
study, the internal consistency of the PCS was .96. 
Sample Size Estimation 
 
Sample size estimation using G*Power (v3.1.9.4, University of Düsseldorf, Germany; Faul et al., 
2009) indicated that 400 participants (n=100 per group) are required for ANOVA with alpha = 
.05, power = .95 and an effect size of .25.  
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Data analysis 
 
Data analyses were conducted with a significance level of α= .05. Chi-square tests of 
independence were conducted to determine any significant demographic group differences. A 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine whether the groups differed in age. 
Hypothesis 1 was analyzed using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, as initial 
screening of the data revealed a non-normal distribution, necessitating a non-parametric 
approach to data analysis (see Results). The medians of the four groups were compared to 
determine whether the high and low numerical groups (Groups 1 and 2) significantly differed, 
and to determine whether the median pain ratings of both Groups 3 and 4 were higher than the 
median pain ratings of Group 2 and lower than Group 1. 
Hypothesis 2, that the median pain ratings of those who are not exposed to an anchor will 
be higher than those who are exposed to the low numerical anchor, but lower than the median 
pain rating of those who are exposed to the high numerical anchor, was analyzed using a 
Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Hypothesis 3, that the median pain ratings of the two control groups (Group 3 and 4) 
would not significantly differ from one another, was analyzed using a Kruskal-Wallis test.  
Hypothesis 4, that participants in Group 4 would anchor to their original pain ratings 
rather than be influenced by the high numerical anchor, was analyzed using a Friedman test. 
Hypothesis 5, that the median pain ratings between participants who believed they had been 
influenced, and participants who believed they had not been influenced by the numerical anchor 
would not differ, was first analyzed using a chi-square test of independence to determine whether 
the proportion of participants being influenced by the anchor differed by group. A Kruskal-
Wallis test was used to determine if pain intensity ratings were significantly different across 
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groups for those participants who reported they had not been influenced by the anchor, and those 
who felt they had been influenced by the anchor. 
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Results 
Demographics 
 
Table 1 shows the demographic variables for the sample of participants. The majority of 
participants self-reported their ethnicity to be Caucasian (n=226, 57.9%) or South Asian (n=97, 
25.2%). The sample was relatively well-educated with 89.4% (n=344) of participants having at 
least some post-secondary education. 62.6% (n=241) of participants endorsed currently 
experiencing an ongoing pain problem, with 32.2% (n=124) reporting they had been diagnosed 
with chronic pain by a physician. Of the 330 participants on whom longitude and latitude was 
reported, the majority were located in North America (n=214, 57.1%) or India (n=95, 25.3%), 
with the remaining 21 (5.6%) being from South America (n=8, 2.1%), Asia (n=5, 1.3%), Europe 
(n=6, 1.6%), and Africa (n=2, 0.5%).
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Table 1 
Demographic information for the four groups  
 Group 1 
(n= 102) 
Group 2 
(n= 92)  
Group 3 
(n= 102) 
Group 4 
(n= 87) 
X(df) p 
Age (years) (SD) 35.06 (10.11) 34.80 (9.47) 37.13 (11.63) 39.34 (11.84)   
Sex n (%)   
Male 64 (62.7%) 53 (57%) 50 (49%) 55 (63.2%) 5.319(3) .150 
Female 38 (37.3%) 40 (43%) 52 (51%) 32 (36.8%)  
Education n (%)   
High School 4 (3.9%) 12 (12.9%) 15 (14.7%) 10 (11.5%) 16.456(9) .058 
Some post-secondary 33 (32.4%) 18 (19.4%) 17 (16.7%) 22 (25.3%)   
Post-secondary 41 (40.2%) 49 (52.7%) 47 (46.1%) 38 (43.7%)   
Graduate degree 24 (23.5%) 14 (15.1%) 23 (22.5%) 17 (19.5%)   
Ethnicity n (%)   
White 62 (60.8%) 51 (54.8%) 62 (60.8%) 51 (58.6%) 9.044(12) .699 
South Asian 23 (22.5%) 27 (29%) 26 (25.5%) 21 (24.1%)   
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African Descent 5 (4.9%) 5 (5.4%) 6 (5.9%) 10 (11.5%)   
Other 11 (10.8%) 10 (10.8%) 7 (6.9%) 5 (5.7%)   
Ongoing Pain n (%) 
Yes 63 (61.8%) 56 (60.2%) 72 (70.6%) 49 (56.3%) 8.030(6) .236 
No 39 (38.2%) 35 (37.6%) 30 (29.4%) 37 (42.5%)   
Pain Duration n (%) 
< 3 months 9 (8.8%) 5 (5.4%) 10 (9.8%) 6 (6.9%) 12.869(12) .379 
3-6 months 6 (5.9%) 12 (12.9%) 14 (13.7%) 2 (2.3%)   
6-12 months 9 (8.8%) 10 (10.8%) 8 (7.8%) 6 (6.9%)   
>1 year 38 (37.3%) 30 (32.3%) 40 (39.2%) 35 (40.2%)   
Pain longer than 3 months n (%) 
Yes 39 (38.2%) 42 (45.2%) 32 (31.4%) 38 (43.7%) 5.989(6) .424 
No 63 (61.8%) 50 (53.8%) 69 (67.6%) 48 (55.2%)   
Chronic Pain n (%)   
Yes 29 (28.4%) 32 (34.4%) 33 (32.4%) 29 (33.3%) 2.023(6) .918 
No 72 (70.6%) 59 (63.4%) 68 (66.7%) 56 (64.4%)   
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Classification of HADS Depression Scores n (%) 
Normal 70 (68.6%) 65 (69.9%) 66 (64.7%) 53 (60.9%) 5.679(6) .450 
Borderline 25 (24.5%) 21 (22.6%) 31 (30.4%) 31 (35.6%)   
Abnormal 7 (6.9%) 7 (7.5%) 5 (4.9%) 3 (3.4%)   
Classification of HADS Anxiety Scores n (%) 
Normal 48 (47.1%) 48 (51.6%) 49 (48%) 55 (63.2%) 7.755(6) .257 
Borderline 24 (23.5%) 17 (18.3%) 26 (25.5%) 12 (13.8%)   
Abnormal 30 (29.4%) 28 (30.1%) 27 (26.5%) 20 (23%)   
Note. * indicates significance at the α=.05 level. SD= Standard Deviation 
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Group characteristics 
 
 Chi-square tests of independence demonstrated no significant differences between 
groups in gender, ethnicity, education, or pain history. (see Table 1).  Chi-square tests also show 
that between groups, there were no significant differences in the number of participants who 
scored above or below the clinical cut-off on the PCS (p= .257) or for the HADS in the 
depression (p= .511) or anxiety (p= .302) subscales, or in self-reported chronic pain (p=.918). A 
Kruskal-Wallis test demonstrated that there was no significant difference in groups for age, 
H(3)= 4.779 p= .189. 
Hypothesis 1: Effects of numerical anchoring on pain scores 
 
Table 2 shows NRS pain intensity ratings for the four groups.  
Table 2 
Median (Interquartile Range) numeric rating scale (NRS) pain intensity scores for the four 
groups 
 Group 1 
(n= 102) 
Group 2 
(n= 92) 
Group 3 
 (n= 102) 
Group 4 
(n= 87) 
Pain intensity rating  
Median (IQR) 
 
8 (2) 6 (2) 7 (2) 7 (2) 
Pain Intensity Rating 
after spinning the wheel 
(Group 4 only) Median 
(IQR) 
--- --- --- 7 (2) 
Note. IQR= Interquartile Range; NRS= Numeric Rating Scale. 
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A visual inspection of the histograms shown in Figure 3 indicated a non-normal 
distribution of the pain intensity ratings, particularly for Group 1. This was confirmed by the 
Shapiro-Wilk test (p<.05). Figure 4 shows the box plots of pain scores for the four groups.  
 
Figure 3. Frequency distributions of pain intensity ratings for Groups 1-4. 
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Figure 4. Boxplots of pain intensity ratings for Groups 1-4. In each box, the bolded line 
represents the median pain rating for each group. The interquartile range (IQR) is a measure of 
variability that is more resistant to outliers than the range or standard deviation. It represents the 
difference between the highest and lowest scores within the middle 50% of a set of scores. In the 
boxplot, the IQR is the difference between the upper quartile (the highest portion of the box), and 
the lower quartile (the lowest portion of the box). For example, the IQR for Group 1 would be 
the difference between the highest portion (8) and the lowest portion (6). Therefore, the IQR for 
Group 1 is IQR= 8 ± 2. The whiskers extending from the box indicate the group’s most and least 
extreme scores (Field, 2009). 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests showed a significant difference between the mean ranks of at least 
one pair of groups in their pain intensity ratings, H(3)= 19.529, p < .001. Dunn's pairwise tests 
revealed that the high-wheel group (Median ± IQR =8 ± 2) rated the patient’s pain significantly 
higher than the low-wheel group (Median ± IQR= 6 ± 2, p < .001)  
Hypothesis 2- Median pain ratings of groups not exposed to the numerical anchor 
The Kruskal-Wallis test above, H(3)= 19.529, p < .001, indicated that there was a significant 
difference between the mean ranks of at least one pair of groups in their pain intensity ratings. 
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Dunn’s pairwise tests revealed that the high-wheel group (Group 1) (Median ± IQR =8 ± 2) rated 
the patient’s pain as being significantly higher than the letter wheel group (Group 3) (Median ± 
IQR = 7 ± 2, p= .023). There were no significant differences in pain rating between the high-
wheel group and Group 4 who initially did not spin a wheel (p= .325). The low wheel group 
rated the patient’s pain significantly lower than both the letter-wheel group (p = .045) as well as 
Group 4, which did not spin a wheel (Median ± IQR = 7 ± 2, p= .045).    
Hypothesis 3- Median pain ratings of control groups 
There were no significant differences in pain ratings between Groups 3 and 4 (p = .230) 
Hypothesis 4 - Anchoring after an initial judgment had been made 
 
A Friedman’s test indicated that there were no significant differences in pain ratings for 
Group 4 between Time 1, initially after reading the vignette, (Mrank= 1.55) and Time 2, after re-
reading the vignette and spinning the high-anchor wheel. (Mrank= 1.45), χ2(1)= 3.2, p=.074. 
Among those who believed they had been influenced by the anchor, there were no significant 
differences in pain ratings between Time 1 (Mrank= 1.56) and Time 2 (Mrank= 1.44), χ2(1) = 0.50, 
p=.480. 
Hypothesis 5 - Influence of the numerical anchor 
 
A chi-square test of independence demonstrated that there were significant differences 
between groups in the proportion of participants who believed that their pain intensity rating of 
the patient had been influenced by the number they spun, χ2 (3) = 11.025, p= .012. Table 3 
demonstrates these results. 
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Table 3 
Participants’ perception of whether they were influenced by the anchor that they were exposed 
to. 
Influence Group 1 
n(%) 
Group 2 
n(%) 
Group 3 
n(%) 
Group 4 
n(%) 
χ2 (df) p 
Yes 36 
(35.3%) 
19 
(20.4%) 
17 
(16.7%) 
19 
(21.8%) 
11.025(3) .012* 
No 66 
(64.7%) 
74 
(79.6%) 
85 
(83.3%) 
67 (77%)   
Note. * indicates significance at the α= .05 level. 
In particular, participants in Group 1 were significantly more likely to believe that they 
had been influenced by the anchor, while participants in Group 3 were significantly more likely 
to believe that they had not been influenced by the anchor. In Group 1, 35.3% (n=36) of 
participants endorsed being influenced, in comparison to 20.4% (n=19) in Group 2, 16.7% 
(n=17) in Group 3, and 21.8% (n=19) in Group 4 after these participants had spun the high 
anchor wheel.  
A Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that among participants who indicated they were not 
influenced by the anchor, there were no significant differences between groups in pain intensity 
ratings, H(3)= 7.214, p= .065. In contrast, there were significant differences in pain intensity 
ratings across groups among those participants who indicated they had been influenced by the 
anchor, H(3)= 13.644, p= .003. Dunn’s pairwise tests indicated that participants in Group 2 
(Median ± IQR =6 ± 5), who spun the low-anchor wheel, rated the patient’s pain significantly 
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lower than participants in Group 1 (Median ± IQR =8 ± 1), who spun the high-anchor wheel (p= 
.003), as well as participants in Group 4 (Median ± IQR =8 ± 2), who initially did not spin a 
wheel, but later spun the high-anchor wheel (p= .026). Participants in Group 1 who indicated 
they had been influenced by the anchor reported significantly higher pain intensity ratings than 
participants in Group 3 (Median ± IQR =7 ± 2), who spun a wheel containing letters (p= .006). 
Finally, among those who believed they had been influenced by the anchor, participants in group 
4 rated the patient’s pain significantly higher than participants in group 3 (p=.046).  In addition, a 
Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that after participants in Group 4 had spun the high-anchor wheel 
and re-rated the patient’s pain, those who indicated that they had been influenced by the anchor 
tended to rate the patient’s pain as being significantly higher than those who believed they had 
not been influenced by the anchor, H(1)= 5.881, p= .015. 
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Discussion 
 
This study examined whether prior exposure to a pain-unrelated, random numerical 
anchor would influence participant’s ratings of a hypothetical patient’ pain intensity.  This was 
done by asking participants to read a vignette depicting a hypothetical patient who lives with 
chronic pain, before asking the participants to spin a wheel programmed to land on a high 
numerical anchor (8), a low numerical anchor (2), or a letter (C or I). A fourth group served as a 
control condition and did not spin a wheel initially before rating the patient’s pain intensity, but 
were later asked to spin the high-anchor wheel and re-rate the patient’s pain.  
At first glance, the findings appear to support the main hypothesis, that exposure to a 
numerical anchor would influence participant’s estimations of a hypothetical patient’s pain 
intensity. Participants who spun a high numerical anchor estimated that the hypothetical patient 
experienced a much higher pain intensity than did the other three groups. Additionally, 
participants in the low numerical anchor condition had the lowest estimation of pain intensity for 
the hypothetical patient. The second hypothesis, that participants in the letter-wheel group as 
well as the control group who originally did not spin a wheel, would have median pain ratings 
that were lower than participants who spun a high-anchor wheel, but higher than participants 
who spun a low-anchor wheel, were only partially supported. Participants in the letter-wheel 
condition were found to have this result; however, those in the control group that did not initially 
spin a wheel did not have a median pain rating that was significantly lower than the high-wheel 
group, but the median pain rating of the no-wheel group was significantly higher than the low-
wheel group. Importantly, there was no difference in pain intensity ratings between participants 
who spun a wheel containing a letter and the control group that did not spin a wheel (Hypothesis 
3), indicating that the spinning of the wheel itself had no effect on pain intensity ratings. These 
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results are in line with a number of studies that have also used a spinning wheel or similar 
devices to anchor their participants to a random numerical anchor (Mussweiler, Englich, & 
Strack, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Given that the no-wheel group’s median pain intensity rating was not significantly lower 
than the high-anchor group’s rating, and given that there were no significant differences between 
the letter-wheel and no-wheel control groups, these results may suggest that regardless of the 
presence of an anchor or not, the pain intensity that was depicted within the vignette may have 
been in line with a higher pain intensity. The anchoring effect is still demonstrated in this study 
in that there were significant differences between the median pain ratings of the high- and low-
anchor conditions; however, that there were no significant differences between the high-anchor 
group and the no-wheel control group’s median pain intensity rating indicates that the vignette 
itself may have been a confounding factor.  
The fourth hypothesis, that those participants who were originally not exposed to an 
anchor would anchor to their original pain rating when asked to re-rate the patient’s pain, even 
when subsequently exposed to the high-anchor, was supported. Participants did not adjust their 
second pain ratings when asked to re-rate the patient’s pain. This was expected, given the results 
of Riva et al. (2011), who similarly found that health care providers did not significantly adjust 
their results when asked to re-rate a patient’s pain, even when given additional information about 
the patient’s subjective pain rating.  
 The fifth hypothesis, that the median pain ratings in each group would not differ between 
those who did and did not believe they had been influenced by the anchor, was unsupported. In 
the high-anchor group, those participants who believed they had been influenced had a 
significantly higher median pain rating than those who did not believe they had been influenced. 
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Similarly, in the low-anchor group, those participants who believed they had been influenced had 
a significantly lower median pain rating than those who did not believe they had been influenced. 
While the majority of participants in all four groups indicated that they were not influenced by 
the anchor, those participants who spun a high anchor were also more likely than any other group 
to indicate that they had been influenced by the anchor. This may relate to the suggestion above. 
The vignette may have depicted a higher pain rating, and after spinning the wheel and rating the 
patient’s pain as higher, the participants may then have inferred that they must have been 
influenced. This is discussed in more depth below.  
The results also demonstrate that when participants acknowledged the anchor’s influence 
on their pain rating, they do seem to have actually been influenced. Among the participants who 
reported they had been influenced by the anchor, the results were very similar to the overall 
study findings in that participants who spun a high anchor wheel rated the patient’s pain as being 
more intense than all other groups, while those who spun a low anchor wheel rated the patient’s 
pain as being less intense than all other groups. In contrast, the median pain ratings for all four 
groups were not significantly different among those participants who indicated they had not been 
influenced by the anchor. In other words, the anchoring effect was seen only in participants who 
reported that the anchor influenced their decision making. These results deviate from previous 
studies that have examined the role influence on anchoring effects. Although only one study has 
looked directly at whether participants believed they had been influenced or not (Wilson et al., 
1996), both Chapman and Johnson (1999) and Quattrone (1982) investigated whether being 
warned would inhibit the anchoring effect. In all three studies, the anchoring effect was present 
in all participants who were exposed to the anchor, but anchoring effects were consistently 
stronger in cases where the anchor was relevant or informative to the target. However, in none of 
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the three studies were the anchors completely random as they were in the current study, despite 
being uninformative. In the study conducted by Chapman and Johnson (1999), participants were 
anchored to a random dollar amount before being asked target questions about whether they 
would sell a lottery ticket for that dollar amount. Therefore, though the anchor was random and 
uninformative, it was not irrelevant to the task at hand. In the current study, the anchors used 
were both irrelevant, as well as random. As such, the results of the previous studies by Chapman 
and Johnson (1999), as well as Wilson et al. (1996) and Quattrone (1982) do not provide a 
concrete description of the role of influence on random numerical anchoring effects. 
The effect of influence that was seen in the three anchoring conditions was also seen in 
participants in Group 4, who initially did not spin a wheel. After re-reading the vignette, the 
participants were asked to spin the high-anchor wheel and re-rate the patient’s pain. Overall, the 
participants did not change their pain intensity rating after re-rating the pain, which was 
expected. Riva et al. (2011) found similar results in that their participants did not change their 
pain rating when asked to re-evaluate a patient’s pain, and instead anchored to their original 
rating. In the current study however, after spinning the high-anchor wheel, participants in Group 
4 were also asked whether they believed the number they spun had influenced their response. 
This result may be due in part to cognitive dissonance theory- in particular, selective exposure. 
Selective exposure explains that individuals are more likely to be attuned to information that is 
congruent with their previous beliefs, attitudes, or opinions (Sears & Freedman, 1967). In the 
current study, participants were asked to form an opinion of the hypothetical patient’s pain 
intensity; however, the participants were then exposed to new information (the spinning wheel 
containing a high anchor). It may be that participants remained consistent with their original 
response because changing their response would also require them to re-evaluate their perception 
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of the patient’s pain. Despite this, cognitive dissonance theory does not explain why, similar to 
the other three groups in the current study, the anchoring effect was seen only in participants 
who indicated they had been influenced by the anchor, while those who indicated they were not 
influenced tended to evaluate the patient’s pain as being less intense and remain consistent with 
their original pain rating.  
Taking in the entirety of the sample, the results initially suggest that anchoring has 
occurred. However, when also taking into consideration the effect of influence, anchoring only 
appears to have occurred in those who reported that they were influenced. These findings are 
contradictory to the traditional definition of anchoring where anchoring is proposed to occur 
independent of the participant’s knowledge or lack thereof, of the anchor’s influence on their 
subsequent decisions.  
The effect of influence rarely has been evaluated in studies examining anchoring effects. 
Given the traditional anchoring paradigm as designed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), where 
influence is not explored, the majority of anchoring researchers typically have not included a 
question aimed at determining the role of influence on participants’ decision making (Chapman 
& Johnson, 2002). However, Wilson et al. (1996) did explore the role of influence on anchoring. 
In a series of two studies, participants were asked to rate how much they believed their answers 
had been influenced by the anchor. Similar to our study, the majority of their participants 
believed that the anchor had no influence on their response, and higher anchor values were 
associated with more belief of the anchor’s influence. However, in both of the studies conducted 
by Wilson et al (1996), anchoring effects were found even in those who did not acknowledge the 
anchor’s influence. In contrast, the results of the present study showed that there were no 
significant differences in pain intensity ratings among those who believed they had not been 
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influenced by the anchor. One possible explanation for these results relates back to the selective 
accessibility model. Although the spinning wheel provided no actual semantic value, it may be 
that those participants who believed that they were influenced were the ones who were able to 
successfully integrate the vignette with the number they spun, thus adjusting their pain intensity 
rating to be closer to the anchor. Alternatively, these participants may be ones who spent more 
time focusing on the anchor, thus rendering it more accessible and therefore allowing them to 
recognize the anchor’s influence on their pain rating. 
 The selective accessibility model is one explanation for these influence effects. It may 
also be that these influence effects seen across groups are due to a confirmatory search 
mechanism, as proposed by Chapman and Johnson (1999), in that after being exposed to a 
numerical anchor, participants then focused on reasons why that number is consistent with the 
hypothetical patient’s pain, rather than on reasons why the anchor may be inconsistent with the 
patient’s pain intensity. In this way, the numerical anchor may have influenced their decision- 
making. It is interesting, however, that some participants (16.7%) in Group 3 who spun a letter, 
indicated that they had been influenced by the anchor, despite the anchor being a letter value 
rather than a numeric one and therefore holding no possible relevant information for a numeric 
rating scale. This finding may be due to a demand effect (Grice, Cole, & Morgan, 1975; 
Schwarz, 1994), where participants may have inferred that they would not have been asked to 
spin a letter or had their attention subsequently drawn to it through the questions asked of them if 
the letter was not relevant or informative in some way. Finally, as noted by Nisbett and Ross 
(1980), these influence effects do not necessarily indicate that those who believed they were 
influenced actually were influenced. Rather, it may be that after being exposed to the anchor, the 
16.7% of participants in the letter wheel group who believed that they had been influenced by the 
  39 
  
 
anchor  inferred that their judgment must have been influenced, based on the response that they 
gave (Wilson et al., 1996). 
That participants in the letter-wheel group believed they had been influenced by the letter 
they spun may also be indicative of a baseline percentage of participants who would believe they 
were influenced. Further studies should also seek to establish a baseline of what proportion of a 
sample will believe that they had been influenced. 
Limitations 
 
The current study has a number of limitations that are important to consider. Given that 
the study was completed online, it is possible that participants were not able to fully attend to the 
vignette, wheel, or the subsequent questions. As a result, the anchoring effects and influence 
effects seen may be due instead to the fact that the participants had very recently been exposed to 
a number rather than true anchoring effects. That is, if participants were not attending fully, they 
may have rated the participant’s pain according to the numerical anchor they were exposed to 
simply due to the availability of the anchor in their memory rather than because that is the pain 
intensity rating they believe the patient experiences, or because of anchoring effects. These same 
participants might subsequently indicate that they had been influenced by the anchor as their 
response was based on the number they had been exposed to.  Previous studies have 
demonstrated that data collected through Mechanical Turk is as reliable as data collected in a 
laboratory setting, with the exception of attention paid to the study itself (Gabrielle Paolacci & 
Chandler, 2014; Gabriele Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Typically this limitation is 
overcome through the use of validity questions to ensure that the participant is attending to the 
study (Gabriele Paolacci et al., 2010). The current study did contain validity questions, such as 
asking the participants which number or letter they spun; however, it is possible that additional 
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validity questions regarding the vignette would have helped to more effectively screen out 
inattention. 
A second limitation is that the current study has no pilot data on the vignette that was 
used to give a description of the hypothetical patient. As a result, it is unknown what the 
patient’s baseline pain intensity would be rated as. This information would help to ensure that the 
vignette itself was not a confounding variable. For instance, if the vignette was shown to depict a 
pain intensity that is higher without the presence of a numerical anchor, it is possible that the 
influence effect that was seen in the high-anchor group may have been due to participants 
inferring that they had been influenced given the pain intensity rating that they had given.  
Finally, the current study is limited by the fact that it is one of the first anchoring studies 
to look at the effect of influence on anchoring effects. As such, the questions regarding influence 
had not been previously tested, and may not have been valid, or may have unwittingly created 
biased responses.  
Strengths 
 
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the study also has a number of strengths. 
Firstly, with a relatively large sample size of participants that were recruited globally, it is likely 
that the data is not only reliable but also cross-culturally validated. Participants were diverse in 
their age, education, ethnicity, and pain history which also helps to ensure that the data is valid 
and generalizable. In order to ensure that the results would be generalizable, Mechanical Turk 
was chosen as the primary recruitment method for this study, as previous studies have shown that 
the data collected through Mechanical is as reliable as data gathered from undergraduate 
participants (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).  
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 Secondly, the current study is strengthened by the presence of two control conditions. In 
this way, both the effect of spinning a wheel as well as the effect of having the wheel land on a 
number, could be controlled. This helps to ensure that the anchoring effects seen are in fact due 
to anchoring effects, as opposed to being due to a confounding variable. 
 Finally, this study is one of the only studies to have looked at the effect of influence and 
found that anchoring effects were contingent upon the participant’s belief that they had been 
influenced. Anchoring research has been very robust and well-established, but there has been 
very little research on the effect of influence on anchoring, and what these findings mean for the 
definition of anchoring itself. This study’s results may help to better understand anchoring 
effects as a whole, as well as its underlying cognitive pathways. 
Future directions 
 
Future studies should attempt to clarify the role of influence on numerical anchoring. 
Namely, attempts should be made to replicate anchoring studies while also considering 
participant’s perception of influence. It may be that the current definition of anchoring is not 
suitable if the effects of influence are reliably seen across studies, given that the current 
definition implies that participants are not aware of the anchor’s influence on their judgment. 
Future studies should also expand on the current research about how random numerical 
anchoring might affect the pain response. In particular, it would be interesting to determine 
whether these same random numerical anchors could affect a participant’s judgment of their own 
pain experience in both acute and chronic pain experiences. The current study has demonstrated 
that anchoring effects can influence how a hypothetical patient’s pain is inferred. However, this 
study did not investigate how random numerical anchoring may influence how a patient’s pain is 
perceived or treated. As such, future studies may also look at how numerical anchoring may be 
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evident in the health care context in relation to how random numerical anchors may influence a 
health care provider’s judgment and treatment of a chronic pain patient’s experience.  
Conclusion 
 
The results of this study are consistent with previous studies of numerical anchoring. 
Exposure to a high numerical anchor influenced participants’ subsequent rating of a hypothetical 
patient’s pain to be higher, while exposure to a low numerical anchor influenced participants to 
rate the patient’s pain as lower. However, while the majority of participants across groups did 
not believe they were influenced by the anchor, the anchoring effect was seen only in 
participants who did indicate that the anchor had influenced their judgments. Further research is 
necessary to determine the role of influence on anchoring effects, and the applicability of 
anchoring effects in the healthcare context. 
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Form 
 Informed Consent Form- Pain Vignette Study 
Purpose of the Research: The ability of humans to accurately identify pain in others is 
crucial to the appropriate provision of aid. In this study, we are interested in your ratings 
of a person’s pain after reading a hypothetical vignette. 
What You Will Be Asked to do in the Research: You will be asked to complete a few 
demographic and other questions. You will then be asked to read a short vignette of a 
hypothetical patient and rate their pain. You will then be asked to answer some 
computer-based questionnaires. The study will take approximately 10-15 minutes to 
complete. 
Benefits of the Research and Benefits to You: There are no major benefits that may 
reasonably be expected to result from this study, except the knowledge that you are 
contributing to graduate education and the advancement of science.  
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you 
may choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will not 
influence your relationship with York U, the researchers, or any other group associated 
with the project.  
Withdrawal from the Study:  You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any 
reason, if you so decide.  If you decide to stop participating, you will still be eligible to 
receive the promised credit for agreeing to be in the project. Your decision to stop 
participating, or refusal to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship 
with the researchers, York University, or any other group associated with this project. In 
the event you withdraw from the study and you do not wish the investigators to use your 
data, please let them know and the data will be destroyed. 
Risks: There are no known risks associated with participating in this study. Should you 
feel any distress as a result of participating in the present study you may contact the York 
University Personal Counselling Services at 416-736-5297. 
Confidentiality: All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence. 
. Your name or any other identifying information will not appear in any report or 
publication of the research. All data collected will be anonymized (will not contain 
personal identifying information). 
Questions About the Research?  If you have questions about the research in general 
or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact Dr. Katz either by telephone at 
416-736-2100, extension 40557 or by e-mail (jkatz@yorku.ca). This research has been 
reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York 
University’s Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-
Council Research Ethics guidelines.  If you have any questions about this process, or 
about your rights as a participant in the study, please contact the Sr. Manager & Policy 
Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York 
University (telephone 416-736-5914 or e-mail ore@yorku.ca). 
Legal Rights and Signatures: 
I                                              , consent to participate in the study “Pain Vignette Study” 
conducted by Dr. Joel Katz and Rebecca Lewinson. I have understood the nature of this 
project and wish to participate. I am not waiving any of my legal rights by consenting to 
this statement. My selection below indicates my consent. 
Signature     Date        
Participant 
Signature     Date        
Person obtaining consent 
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Appendix B: Demographic Questions 
1. How old are you? (text box) 
2. What is your gender? (Multiple choice) 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Other: ______ 
3. How do you self-identify regarding your ethnicity? (multiple-choice with other option) 
a. Aboriginal 
b. African-Caribbean 
c. African-American 
d. East Asian (e.g. Hong Kong, China, Vietnam, Korea) 
e. Hispanic/Latino/a 
f. Middle-Eastern or North African (e.g. Iran, Israel, Egypt, Morocco) 
g. South Asian (e.g. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) 
h. White 
i. Other: ____ 
4. What is your highest level of education? 
a. Some high school 
b. High school diploma 
c. Some college/university 
d. College diploma 
e. University degree 
f. Master’s degree 
g. Doctoral degree 
h. Other:____ 
5. If you are attending, or have attended post-secondary education, what is your major field 
of study? _____ 
6. Do you have any ongoing pain problems? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
7. If you have ongoing pain problems, list diagnosis or type of pain and location (text box) 
8. If you have ongoing pain problems, how long have you had the pain? 
a. Less than 3 months 
b. 3 months- 6 months 
c. 6 months- 1 year 
d. More than 1 year 
9. Have you ever been diagnosed by a doctor with a chronic pain problem? If yes, indicate 
the diagnosis and location (text box) 
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Appendix C: Anchoring Questions 
 
1. What number/letter did you spin*? 
2. Using the above scale, do you think Steve’s pain intensity on a typical day is higher than, 
lower than, or equal to the number you just spun? **/*** 
a. Higher 
b. Lower 
c. Equal 
3. Using the 0-10 scale above, how intense do you think Steve’s pain is on a typical day? 
a. Why did you choose that number? 
4. Do you think that the number/letter you spun influenced your rating of Steve’s pain? 
*/*** 
a. Why do you think the number/letter influenced your rating of Steve’s pain? 
b. Why do you think the number/letter you spun did not influence your rating of 
Steve’s pain? 
5. If a health-care professional were to rate Steve’s pain, how intense do you think they 
would rate it to be? 
a. What made you choose that number? 
6. Please re-read the vignette. 
Steve lives in a modest house on a quiet, tree-lined street very close to a major highway. 
Last year, as Steve was driving to work one morning, he was involved in a serious 
collision that nearly cost him his life. He spent months in the hospital and underwent 
multiple surgeries to repair his leg which was shattered in the crash. After many more 
months of physical rehabilitation, Steve is left with chronic leg pain and requires a cane 
to walk especially when the pain acts up. Steve sees his physical therapist once a week 
for treatment and despite the increased pain he has after each session, he feels the 
therapy is helping. 
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Now imagine you hadn’t spun the wheel.  Please use the 0-10 scale shown above to rate 
how intense you think Steve’s pain is on a typical day. 
** This item was customized to say “number” or “letter” depending on group assignment. 
** indicates an item that was asked only for Groups 1 and 2 
*** Indicates an item that was not asked for Group 4 
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Appendix D: Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
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Appendix E: Pain Catastrophizing Scale 
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Appendix F: Debrief Form 
 
Debrief form: The effect of unconscious numerical anchoring on participants’ rating of 
others’ pain- Study 2 
Numerical anchoring is a type of cognitive bias that influences people’s ratings of 
quantities of objects by presenting them with a number before asking for their estimate.  A good 
example of this would be if we showed one group of people the number 650 and another group 
the number 75 before asking them to guess the number of subway stations in the underground 
system in London, England. Those shown the higher number would produce higher estimates 
than those shown the lower number (the actual number is 270).  
The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of unconscious numerical 
anchoring on ratings of a hypothetical patient’s pain. In this study, there were 4 groups of 
participants. Each group read the same vignette about Steve but two groups spun a wheel that 
contained numbers. One of these groups spun a high number, and the other group spun a low 
number. The third group spun a wheel that contained letters rather than numbers. Finally, the last 
group did not spin a wheel at all. The purpose of this study was to determine whether the number 
that was spun influenced participants’ rating of the hypothetical patient’s pain.  
Because cognitive biases like the anchoring effect can be partly counter-acted by thinking 
carefully about the question you’ve been asked especially if you know someone is attempting to 
influence you, we could not tell you the purpose of the study in advance.  
We would like to ask that you keep the true nature of this study confidential, and not 
discuss it with your peers. If any other participants know that the study assesses anchoring prior 
to their participation, their results will not be able to be used as it can change the responses they 
would give. 
If you have any questions, comments, or concerns about this research, please feel free to 
contact Dr. Joel Katz at 416-736-2100 ext. 40557, or jkatz@yorku.ca. If you have any ethical 
concerns regarding this study, please contact the Coordinator, Research Ethics Review, Office of 
Research Ethics, at ext. 55201 or at ore@yorku.ca. 
If you have general interest in numerical anchoring, you may wish to consult the 
following references: 
 Critcher, C.R., & Gilovich, T. (2008). Incidental environmental anchors. Journal of  
  Behavioural Decision Making, 21, 241-251. doi: 10.1002/bdm.586. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
  Science, 185, 1124-1131.  
Kahneman, D. (2013). Thinking, fast and slow. Toronto, ON: Anchor, Canada. 
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Thank you very much for your participation! We greatly appreciate the time you have 
taken to participate in this study, and the effort that you have put forth. 
 
I, _____________________________, consent to the use of my data in the study “The effect of 
unconscious numerical anchoring on participants’ rating of others’ pain- Study 2” conducted by 
Dr. Joel Katz & Rebecca Lewinson.  I have understood the nature of this project and wish to 
participate.  I am not waiving any of my legal rights by consenting to this statement.  My 
selection below indicates my consent. 
 
           
Participant Signature    Date 
 
              
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent Date 
 
